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http://ssrn.com/abstract=370440
 
 

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Lobbying Against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes


Andreas Polk


Berlin School of Economics and Law

Armin Schmutzler


University of Zurich - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 2003

U of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute Working Paper No. 0301

Abstract:     
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Environmental Regulation, Pollution Standards, Interest Groups, Lobbying, Policy Making

JEL Classification: D72, D78, L51

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Date posted: March 13, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Polk, Andreas and Schmutzler, Armin, Lobbying Against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes (January 2003). U of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute Working Paper No. 0301. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=370440 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.370440

Contact Information

Andreas Polk (Contact Author)
Berlin School of Economics and Law ( email )
Badensche Strasse 50-51
Berlin, D-10825
Germany
+49 30 85789162 (Phone)
Armin Schmutzler
University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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