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The Pricing Puzzle: The Default Term Structure of Collateralised Loan Obligations


Andreas A. Jobst


Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA); International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM)

December 2002

CFS Working Paper No. 2002/14

Abstract:     
Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 96

Keywords: Loan securitisation, CLO, structured finance

JEL Classification: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20

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Date posted: April 7, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Jobst, Andreas A., The Pricing Puzzle: The Default Term Structure of Collateralised Loan Obligations (December 2002). CFS Working Paper No. 2002/14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=370641 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.370641

Contact Information

Andreas A. Jobst (Contact Author)
Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) ( email )
43 Victoria Street
Hamilton, HM 12
Bermuda
+1-441-278-0334 (Phone)
+1-441-296-6912 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bma.bm
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
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