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Why are Put Options So Expensive?

Oleg Bondarenko
University of Illinois at Chicago - Department of Finance


April 2003

AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; University of Illinois at Chicago Working Paper

Abstract:     
This paper studies the "overpriced puts puzzle" - the finding that historical prices of the S&P 500 put options have been too high and incompatible with the canonical asset-pricing models, such as CAPM and Rubinstein (1976) model. Simple trading strategies that involve selling at-the-money and out-of-the-money puts would have earned extraordinary profits. To investigate whether put returns could be rationalized by another, possibly nonstandard equilibrium model, we implement a new methodology. The methodology is "model-free" in the sense that it requires no parametric assumptions on investors' preferences. Furthermore, the methodology can be applied even when the sample is affected by certain selection biases (such as the Peso problem) and when investors' beliefs are incorrect.

We find that no model within a fairly broad class of models can possibly explain the put anomaly.

Keywords: Market Market Efficiency Hypothesis, Rational Learning, Option Valuation, Risk-Neutral Density, Peso Problem

JEL Classifications: G12, G13, G14

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 29, 2003 ; Last revised: October 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bondarenko, Oleg, Why are Put Options So Expensive? (April 2003). AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; University of Illinois at Chicago Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=375784 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.375784


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Contact Information

Oleg Bondarenko (Contact Author)
University of Illinois at Chicago - Department of Finance ( email )
601 South Morgan Street
Room 2431
Chicago, IL 60607-7124
United States
(312) 996-2362 (Phone)
(312) 413-7948 (Fax)
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