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The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality

David S. Evans

University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

Jorge Padilla

Compass Lexecon

Christian Ahlborn

Linklaters LLP

April 21, 2003

Antitrust Bulletin, 2003

We describe the main features of U.S. and E.C. tying law and consider their recent evolution. We then review the economic literature on tying and summarize its main implications for the analysis of tying cases: First, recent advances in economic theory unambiguously endorse a rule-of-reason approach to tying such as that adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Microsoft III. Second, there is no economic basis for a per se prohibition of tying. And third, the modified per se rule adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish does not accurately screen pro-competitive from anticompetitive tying. Drawing on the findings of the economic models developed by the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools, we conclude by proposing a three-step test to implement rigorously a rule-of-reason analysis to tying cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 69

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41

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Date posted: June 2, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S. and Padilla, Jorge and Ahlborn, Christian, The Antitrust Economics of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality (April 21, 2003). Antitrust Bulletin, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=381940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.381940

Contact Information

David S. Evans (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
Jorge Padilla
Compass Lexecon ( email )
Paseo de Recoletos 7-9
Madrid, 28004
Christian Ahlborn
Linklaters LLP ( email )
One Silk Street
London EC2Y 8HQ
United Kingdom
44 20 7456 2000 (Phone)
44 20 7456 2222 (Fax)
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