Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=383620
 
 

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Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game


Stephen Morris


Princeton University - Department of Economics

February 2003

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1401

Abstract:     
Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Common Knowledge, Coordination, Communication

JEL Classification: C72, D8

working papers series





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Date posted: February 26, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Morris, Stephen, Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game (February 2003). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1401. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=383620

Contact Information

Stephen Edward Morris (Contact Author)
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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