The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John Wilcox
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
John C. Coates, IV
Harvard Law School
Harvard Business School
Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 11, pp. 17-19, 2003
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 410, February 2003
In recent work, we presented evidence indicating that staggered boards have adverse effects on target shareholders. John Wilcox, the Vice-Chair of Georgeson, recently published a critique of our work, urging shareholders to support staggered boards. We respond in this article to Wilcox's critique and explain why it does not weaken in any way our analysis of staggered boards.
The study criticized by Wilcox, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," 54 Stanford Law Review 887-951 (2002), is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304388. In a separate reply, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants," 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002), which is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=360840, we respond to several other responses to our original study and present additional evidence that confirms its conclusions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords: Takeover, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, defensive tactics, staggered boards, poison pills, premia, independent directors
JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22
Date posted: March 3, 2003 ; Last revised: April 29, 2009
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.203 seconds