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The Trouble with Staggered Boards: A Reply to Georgeson's John Wilcox
Lucian A. Bebchuk Harvard University - Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) John C. Coates, IV Harvard Law School Guhan Subramanian Harvard Business School Corporate Governance Advisor, Vol. 11, pp. 17-19, 2003 Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 410, February 2003 Abstract: In recent work, we presented evidence indicating that staggered boards have adverse effects on target shareholders. John Wilcox, the Vice-Chair of Georgeson, recently published a critique of our work, urging shareholders to support staggered boards. We respond in this article to Wilcox's critique and explain why it does not weaken in any way our analysis of staggered boards. The study criticized by Wilcox, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," 54 Stanford Law Review 887-951 (2002), is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304388. In a separate reply, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants," 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002), which is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=360840, we respond to several other responses to our original study and present additional evidence that confirms its conclusions.
Keywords: Takeover, mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, takeover bids, defensive tactics, staggered boards, poison pills, premia, independent directors JEL Classifications: G30, G34, K22 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: March 03, 2003 ; Last revised: April 29, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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