|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple ApplicationsJames AlbrechtGeorgetown University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Pieter A. GautierFree University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Susan VromanGeorgetown University; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) February 2003 IZA Discussion Paper No. 719 Abstract: We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31 Keywords: Job Search, Directed Search, Matching JEL Classification: J64, D83, J41 working papers seriesDate posted: March 13, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 1.125 seconds
