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Regulation with Wage Bargaining


Espen R. Moen


Norwegian School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Dag Morten Dalen


BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics

Nils-Henrik M. Von der Fehr


University of Oslo - Department of Economics
February 2003

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3748

Abstract:     
In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. In this Paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Regulation, wage bargaining

JEL Classification: J30, L51

working papers series


Date posted: March 7, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Moen, Espen R., Dalen, Dag Morten and Von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M., Regulation with Wage Bargaining (February 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3748. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=385905

Contact Information

Espen R. Moen (Contact Author)
Norwegian School of Management ( email )
N-0442 Oslo
Norway
+47 67 557 395 (Phone)
+47 67 557 675 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Dag Morten Dalen
BI Norwegian Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
N-0442 Oslo
Norway
+47 46410774 (Phone)
Nils-Henrik M. Von der Fehr
University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47 22 85 51 40 (Phone)
+47 22 85 50 35 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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