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http://ssrn.com/abstract=387520
 
 

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Of Property and Anti-Property


Abraham Bell


Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law; University of San Diego School of Law

Gideon Parchomovsky


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law

March 1, 2003

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-04
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, p. 1, 2003

Abstract:     
In this Article, we introduce the concept of anti-property - a private conservation mechanism that allows only socially desirable development. Our mechanism utilizes veto rights to create a collective holdout dynamic that thwarts undesirable uses of conservation commons. We demonstrate, counterintuitively, that when transaction costs systematically bias the market against conservation, the best response may be to create countervailing transaction costs. We also show how the combination of a private anti-property mechanism with a carefully designed takings law may result in an optimal balance between conservation and development.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 76

Keywords: property, conservation, preservation, commons, anticommons

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Date posted: March 13, 2003 ; Last revised: September 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, Of Property and Anti-Property (March 1, 2003). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-04; Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, p. 1, 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=387520 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.387520

Contact Information

Abraham Bell
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
HOME PAGE: http://law.biu.ac.il/English/segelE.php#
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
Gideon Parchomovsky (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1603 (Phone)
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Gan 52900
Israel
972-2-5317078 (Phone)
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