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Of Property and Anti-PropertyAbraham BellUniversity of San Diego School of Law; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law Gideon ParchomovskyUniversity of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law March 1, 2003 U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-04 Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, p. 1, 2003 Abstract: In this Article, we introduce the concept of anti-property - a private conservation mechanism that allows only socially desirable development. Our mechanism utilizes veto rights to create a collective holdout dynamic that thwarts undesirable uses of conservation commons. We demonstrate, counterintuitively, that when transaction costs systematically bias the market against conservation, the best response may be to create countervailing transaction costs. We also show how the combination of a private anti-property mechanism with a carefully designed takings law may result in an optimal balance between conservation and development.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 76 Keywords: property, conservation, preservation, commons, anticommons working papers seriesDate posted: March 13, 2003 ; Last revised: September 21, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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