Of Property and Anti-Property
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law; University of San Diego School of Law
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law
March 1, 2003
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-04
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 102, p. 1, 2003
In this Article, we introduce the concept of anti-property - a private conservation mechanism that allows only socially desirable development. Our mechanism utilizes veto rights to create a collective holdout dynamic that thwarts undesirable uses of conservation commons. We demonstrate, counterintuitively, that when transaction costs systematically bias the market against conservation, the best response may be to create countervailing transaction costs. We also show how the combination of a private anti-property mechanism with a carefully designed takings law may result in an optimal balance between conservation and development.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 76
Keywords: property, conservation, preservation, commons, anticommonsworking papers series
Date posted: March 13, 2003 ; Last revised: September 21, 2008
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