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Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies?


Renee B. Adams


University of New South Wales; Financial Research Network (FIRN); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Hamid Mehran


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

March 2003


Abstract:     
We analyze a range of corporate governance variables as they pertain to a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) and manufacturing firms. We find that BHCs have larger boards and that the percentage of outside directors on these boards is significantly higher; also, BHC boards have more committees and meet slightly more frequently. Conversely, the proportion of CEO stock option pay to salary plus bonuses as well as the percentage and market value of direct equity holdings are smaller for bank holding companies. Furthermore, fewer institutions hold shares of BHCs relative to shares of manufacturing firms, and the institutions hold a smaller percentage of a BHC's equity. These observed differences in variables suggest that governance structures are industry-specific. The differences, we argue, might be due to differences in the investment opportunities of the firms in the two industries as well as to the presence of regulation in the banking industry.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Governance, Board of Directors, Bank Holding Company, Investment Opportunities, Regulation, Policy

JEL Classification: G3, G32, G34, G38

working papers series


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Date posted: May 1, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Adams, Renee B. and Mehran, Hamid , Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Holding Companies? (March 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=387561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.387561

Contact Information

Renée B. Adams
University of New South Wales ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61(2)93854280 (Phone)

Financial Research Network (FIRN)
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Hamid Mehran (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-6215 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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