Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=388880
 
 

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Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Norbert Schulz


University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics

Ben Depoorter


University of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics


European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279

Abstract:     
This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

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Date posted: March 20, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Schulz, Norbert and Depoorter, Ben, Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons. European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=388880 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.388880

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Norbert Schulz
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics ( email )
Sanderring 2
Lehrstuhl VWL III
D-97070 Wuerzburg
Germany
+49-931/31 29 60 (Phone)
+49-931/31 26 21 (Fax)
Ben Depoorter
University of California Hastings College of Law ( email )
200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics ( email )
Ghent Univ. Law School
Universiteitstraat 4
Gent, 9000
Belgium
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