|
|
|
|
||||
|
||||
Simultaneous and Sequential AnticommonsFrancesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna Norbert SchulzUniversity of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics Ben DepoorterUniversity of California Hastings College of Law; Ghent University - Center for Advanced Studies in Law & Economics European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11 Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279 Abstract: This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: March 20, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.515 seconds
