Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons
University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna
University of Wuerzburg - Department of Economics
University of California Hastings College of Law; Ugent - CASLE; Stanford CIS
European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, No. 2, March 2004
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-11
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 279
This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70
Date posted: March 20, 2003
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