  |
|
|
||||
|
||||
Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation
Rüdiger Fahlenbrach Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne; Ohio State University - Department of Finance March 12, 2008 Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2008-5 and Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2008-03-004 Review of Finance, Forthcoming Abstract: I analyze the role of executive compensation in corporate governance. As proxies for corporate governance, I use board size, board independence, CEO-chair duality, institutional ownership concentration, CEO tenure, and an index of shareholder rights. The results from a broad cross-section of large U.S. public firms are inconsistent with recent claims that entrenched managers design their own compensation contracts. The interactions of the corporate governance mechanisms with total pay-for-performance and excess compensation can be explained by governance substitution. If a firm has generally weaker governance, the compensation contract helps better align the interests of shareholders and the CEO.
Keywords: Compensation, Corporate Governance, Governance Incentive Substitution JEL Classifications: G32, G34, J33 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: May 08, 2003 ; Last revised: August 07, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apollo1 in 0.172 seconds.
One-Click Download
Facebook
Twitter
Digg
Del.icio.us
CiteULike
