Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=390701
 
 

References (30)



 
 

Citations (12)



 


 



Strategic Disclosure of Risky Prospects: A Laboratory Experiment


Jessen L. Hobson


University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Steven J. Kachelmeier


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting

March 2003


Abstract:     
Evidence from an interactive experiment indicates that the tendency of users to anchor on one-sided disclosures of risk (i.e., disclosing upside potential or downside risk, but not both) is robust to whether disclosures are determined randomly or chosen strategically by opportunistic agents with known preferences for higher valuations. This study therefore addresses qualifications in prior research about the generalizability of cognitive disclosure phenomena to a strategic disclosure environment. One implication supported by the data is that if cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect for one-sided risk disclosures are robust to a strategic environment, strategic agents can capitalize on these biases, extending the menu of strategic opportunities beyond those typically considered in economic models of disclosure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: risk, strategic disclosure, anchoring

JEL Classification: M41, M45, C91

working papers series





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Date posted: May 9, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Hobson, Jessen L. and Kachelmeier, Steven J., Strategic Disclosure of Risky Prospects: A Laboratory Experiment (March 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=390701 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.390701

Contact Information

Jessen L. Hobson
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )
4011 Business Instructional Facility
515 East Gregory Drive
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Steven J. Kachelmeier (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Accounting ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-471-3517 (Phone)
512-471-3904 (Fax)
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References:  30
Citations:  12

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