The Rise and Persistence of Rigidities
University of Toulouse I - GREMAQ-IDEI; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
CEPR Discussion Paper Series #1571
In this paper we argue that employment protection legislation is more likely to arise when the rents earned by the employed over their alternative wage is greater. The model explains why economies with greater real wage rigidity also have greater employment protection. The model also predicts that lower turnover increases the political support for employment protection and that this political support is greater when employment protection is more harmful for employment. Also, rigidities are persistent as they create a constituency of low-productivity sectors whose workers would oppose the removal of firing costs, even though existing rents would not generate support for introducing them. We argue that tight labor markets due to post-war reconstruction needs in Europe made it easier for insiders to create such rents, which in turn led them to support employment protection legislation. In the late 1970s, rents started to fall, but reforms proved difficult because of ratchet effects.
JEL Classification: E6, E24, J3, J6working papers series
Date posted: April 30, 1997
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