Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=392820
 
 

References (9)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition


Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387-395, December 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-16

Abstract:     
While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Tax, Federalism, Harmonization, Rent-Seeking, Commons

JEL Classification: H20, H77

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 4, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Parisi, Francesco, Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 387-395, December 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-16. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=392820 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.392820

Contact Information

Jonathan Klick (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Francesco Parisi
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,761
Downloads: 207
Download Rank: 84,684
References:  9
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.703 seconds