Technological Self-Sufficiency and the Role of Novelty Traps

32 Pages Posted: 17 Nov 2021

See all articles by Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss

New York University - School of Law

Daniel Benoliel

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law; Oxford Intellectual Propert Research Centre (OIPRC)

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

The COVID pandemic has demonstrated the tragic consequences of technological dependency. Unable to manufacture vaccines for themselves, developing countries must rely on obtaining supplies from other nations. While strong arguments have been made to waive international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement to permit these countries to freely use of COVID-related patented inventions, it is not clear that this move would produce sufficient vaccine to meet global demand. Considerable scholarship has been devoted to the question of how to help these countries reach the technological frontier and become technologically independent. In this paper, we identify a novel source of their problem: a structural feature of modern patent law traps technologies in a legal limbo, where there are inadequate incentives to invest in the adaptations and efforts needed to make technologies effectively available in low-income countries. Moreover, the current regime deprives potential innovators of an opportunity to protect their intellectual contributions and begin to build robust innovative ecosystems. The paper proposes a modified patent regime designed to break what we call the 'novelty trap' and discusses its compatibility with international intellectual property law.

Suggested Citation

Dreyfuss, Rochelle Cooper and Benoliel, Daniel, Technological Self-Sufficiency and the Role of Novelty Traps (2021). Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2022, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3928532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928532

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss (Contact Author)

New York University - School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6258 (Phone)
212-995-4760 (Fax)

Daniel Benoliel

University of Haifa - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Carmel
Haifa, 31905
Israel

Oxford Intellectual Propert Research Centre (OIPRC) ( email )

St. Peter's College
New Inn Hall Street
Oxford, OX1 2DL
United Kingdom

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