The Efficiency of the Price System: Evidence from an Alternative Market
University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics
Ramon P. DeGennaro
University of Tennessee, Knoxville - Department of Finance
Raymond D. Sauer
Clemson University - John E. Walker Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 7
Most economists take it for granted that a price mechanism is usually the most effective means of resource allocation. This paper compares two methods of allocating resources in the thoroughbred racing market: a price mechanism and bureaucratic restrictions. It is shown that a simple price mechanism does a superior job of allocating racing ability than a myriad of conditions and restrictions set by even a highly informed expert.
Keywords: Resource allocation, racing, thoroughbred
JEL Classification: A1, D4, G0, L8, P0, P5
Date posted: April 8, 2003
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.203 seconds