Specialization and Rent-Seeking in Moral Enforcement: The Case of Confession
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
January 1, 2003
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 443-61, 2009
UPF Economics and Business Working Paper No. 653
Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38
Keywords: Religion, institutions, confession, morals, law enforcement
JEL Classification: D23, K19, L84, N4, Z1Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: June 18, 2003 ; Last revised: August 11, 2011
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