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Mutual Gains or Zero Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance in the Airline Industry

Jody Hoffer Gittell
Brandeis University - The Heller School for Social Policy and Management

Andrew Von Nordenflycht
Simon Fraser University - Faculty of Business Administration; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Thomas A. Kochan
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management


March 2003

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4298-03; Institute for Work and Employment Research Working Paper No. 01-2003

Abstract:     
We examine competing theoretical arguments regarding whether union representation, shared governance, wage levels and two features of the quality of labor relations - workplace culture and conflict in negotiations - lead to better or worse outcomes for airlines and test them with a mix of historical and quantitative data from major U.S. airlines. Both the qualitative and quantitative results suggest that relational factors - conflict and workplace culture - are more important determinants of performance than the structural factors of unionization, shared governance, and wages. We conclude that efforts to recover from the current crisis in the airline industry that depend primarily on reductions in wages or union power will at best bring only short-term relief from immediate financial pressures. Sustained improvement in service quality and financial performance will require more fundamental improvements in the quality of labor relations.

Keywords: Labor Relations, Major U.S. Airlines

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 15, 2003 ; Last revised: May 27, 2003

Contact Information

Thomas A. Kochan (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
E52-583
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6689 (Phone)
617-253-7696 (Fax)
Jody Hoffer Gittell
Brandeis University - The Heller School for Social Policy and Management ( email )
P.O. Box 549110/MS 035
415 South Street
Waltham, MA 02454
United States
Andrew Von Nordenflycht
Simon Fraser University - Faculty of Business Administration ( email )
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Colombia V5A 1S6
Canada
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
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