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http://ssrn.com/abstract=398740
 
 

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Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply


Ronald J. Gilson


Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


The Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 37-57, 2002

Abstract:     
Three themes animate Martin Lipton and Paul Rowe's thoughtful response to my critical evaluation of Unocal's fifteen-year history. First, they maintain that affording shareholders a primary role in the governance of takeovers depends on a commitment to the stock market's informational efficiency. Second, they claim that allowing shareholders to amend or repeal a poison pill ignores empirical evidence that the existence of a poison pill is associated with higher takeover premiums. Third, they assert that the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) reflects an implicit mega-principle that assigns control over takeovers to managers. This short reply corrects Lipton and Rowe's misunderstanding of the importance of market efficiency in assessing the efficiency of a primary role for shareholders in takeover decision making; suggests that the impact of a poison pill on takeover premiums depends entirely on what a court will allow a target company to do with its pill; and, finally, complicates Lipton and Rowe's argument that the structure of the DGCL implies a primary takeover role for the board.

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Date posted: November 22, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J., Lipton and Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply. The Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 37-57, 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=398740

Contact Information

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
Columbia Law School ( email )
435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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