Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=399801
 
 

References (57)



 
 

Citations (20)



 


 



Who Controls US?


Yoser Gadhoum


University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Business Strategy

Larry H.P. Lang


The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance

Leslie Young


The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance



Abstract:     
Berle and Means focused US analysis of corporate governance on the separation of ownership from control, asserting that US corporations typically have many dispersed shareholders, leaving managers in control. Yet, of the largest 200 US corporations, they had firm evidence of managerial control for only 44 (and 4 out of 106 industrial corporations). We trace the controlling shareholders of all US listed corporations. At the 10 percent control threshold, 59.74 percent have controlling shareholders; 24.57 percent are controlled and managed by a family (the same percentage as in Asia); 16.33 percent are controlled by a widely-held financial institution (close to the percentage in Europe and Asia); 13.55 percent are controlled through family trusts. In the top 30, top 250, top 500 and in every quintile range, the US has more corporations controlled by families than by financial institutions. In almost all these size ranges (defined by the US size thresholds), it has a higher percentage of family-controlled corporations than any of next four largest economies. We interpret these results in terms of regulatory restrictions on bank control of corporations, the agency problems faced by shareholders and the quality of shareholder protection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure

JEL Classification: G32

working papers series


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Date posted: June 9, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Gadhoum, Yoser and Lang, Larry H.P. and Young, Leslie, Who Controls US?. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=399801 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399801

Contact Information

Yoser Gadhoum (Contact Author)
University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Business Strategy ( email )
School of Business Administration
Montreal, Quebec H3C 4R2
Canada
514 987 3000, extension 3107 (Phone)
Hsien Ping Larry Lang
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
+85 2 2609 7761 (Phone)
+85 2 2603 6586 (Fax)
Leslie S.F. Young
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - Department of Finance ( email )
Shatin, N.T.
Hong Kong
852 2609 7421 (Phone)
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