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Liquidation Triggers and the Valuation of Equity and Debt
Dan Galai Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration Alon Raviv Brandeis University -International Business School Zvi Wiener Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration April 2003 EFA 2005 Moscow Meetings Paper Abstract: Many bankruptcy codes implicitly or explicitly contain net-worth covenants, which provide the firm's bondholders with the right to force reorganization or liquidation if the value of the firm falls below a certain threshold. In practice, however, default does not necessarily lead to immediate change of control or to liquidation of the firm's assets by its debtholders. To consider the impact of this on the valuation of corporate securities, we develop a model in which liquidation is driven by a state variable that accumulates with time and severity of distress. Recent or severe distress events may have greater impact on the liquidation trigger. Our model can be applied to a wide array of bankruptcy codes and jurisdictions.
Keywords: default, bankruptcy, liquidation trigger, debt pricing, distress threshold JEL Classifications: G12, G32, G33 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 03, 2005 ; Last revised: August 03, 2005Suggested CitationContact Information
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