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http://ssrn.com/abstract=403960
 
 

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Provincial Protectionism


Konstantin Sonin


Higher School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

December 2005


Abstract:     
In a federal state with weak political institutions, constituent units might protect their enterprises from enforcement of federal taxes. The effectiveness of such protection depends on the ability of local politicians to extract rents from enterprises. They can do so when local monopolies can be effectively sustained and electoral competition is weak. To analyze effects of political decentralization in a country with powerful regional industries, we build a simple general-equilibrium model where local politicians' electoral positions are levels of competition in the regional market, heterogenous firms provide campaign finance and compete in the labor market, and voters care about their wages, but could be influenced by campaign spending.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Federalism, Positive Political Economics, Transition, Development

JEL Classification: P2, P3, H77

working papers series


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Date posted: June 1, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Sonin, Konstantin, Provincial Protectionism (December 2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=403960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.403960

Contact Information

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)
Higher School of Economics ( email )
20 Myasnitskaya street
Moscow, 119017
Russia

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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References:  61
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