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A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets

Mihir A. Desai
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

C. Fritz Foley
Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

James R. Hines Jr.
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


May 2003

Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 03-27

Abstract:     
This paper examines the impact of local tax rates and capital market conditions on the level and composition of borrowing by foreign affiliates of American multinational corporations. The evidence indicates that 10 percent higher local tax rates are associated with 2.8 percent higher debt/asset ratios of American-owned affiliates, and that borrowing from related parties is particularly sensitive to tax rates. Borrowing by American affiliates responds to local inflation and political risks, and is more costly in countries with underdeveloped capital markets and those providing weak legal protections for creditors. Affiliates in environments where external borrowing is costly borrow less from unrelated parties: One percent higher interest rates are associated with 1.4 to 2.0 percent less external debt as a fraction of assets. Instrumental variables analysis reveals that affiliates substitute loans from parent companies for between half and three quarters of the reduced borrowing from unrelated parties stemming from adverse local capital market conditions. These patterns suggest that multinational firms are able to structure their finances in response to tax and capital market conditions, thereby creating opportunities not available to many of their local competitors.

Keywords: Multinational, Capital Structure, Internal Capital Markets, Legal Regime, Law and Finance, Corporate Tax

JEL Classifications: G32, H25, G38, F23

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 09, 2003 ; Last revised: February 23, 2004

Contact Information

Mihir A. Desai (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6693 (Phone)
617-496-6592 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
C. Fritz Foley
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6375 (Phone)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
James Rodger Hines
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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