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Torts, Expertise and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations
Jennifer Arlen New York University School of Law W. Bentley MacLeod Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, p. 494, 2005 USC CLEO Research Paper No. C03-13 NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-06 NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 61 Abstract: The goal of this paper is to examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend both on the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. It is shown that the standard rules for the determination of negligence and damages do not result in an efficient outcome when only physicians are held liable for their torts, but is restored if MCOs are held solely liable for the torts committed by their physicians. There is a damage rule that induces the efficient outcome when physicians are held liable for their torts, however these damages are a complex function of the details of the MCO contract. Accepted Paper Series Date posted: September 28, 2004 ; Last revised: May 29, 2008Suggested CitationContact Information
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