SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

References (34)

Beta

 
 

Citations (9)

Beta

 


 



Torts, Expertise and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations

Jennifer Arlen
New York University School of Law

W. Bentley MacLeod
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)



Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, p. 494, 2005
USC CLEO Research Paper No. C03-13
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-06
NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 61

Abstract:     
The goal of this paper is to examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend both on the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. It is shown that the standard rules for the determination of negligence and damages do not result in an efficient outcome when only physicians are held liable for their torts, but is restored if MCOs are held solely liable for the torts committed by their physicians. There is a damage rule that induces the efficient outcome when physicians are held liable for their torts, however these damages are a complex function of the details of the MCO contract.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: September 28, 2004 ; Last revised: May 29, 2008

Suggested Citation

Arlen, Jennifer and MacLeod, W. Bentley, Torts, Expertise and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, p. 494, 2005; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C03-13; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 03-06; NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 61. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=405740


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Jennifer Arlen (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
William Bentley MacLeod
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
DE-81679 Munich Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,969
Downloads: 392
Download Rank: 21,595
References: 34
Citations: 9

© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was served by apolloa 4 in 0.297 seconds.