Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=405940
 
 

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Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron


Cass R. Sunstein


Harvard Law School

Richard H. Thaler


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people's preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: paternalism, savings, behavioral economics, libertarianism

JEL Classification: A00, A1, D23, D81, E61, H00, H1, K00, K32

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Date posted: May 9, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Sunstein, Cass R. and Thaler, Richard H., Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=405940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.405940

Contact Information

Cass R. Sunstein (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts Ave
Areeda Hall 225
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-2291 (Phone)
Richard H. Thaler
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-5208 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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