Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Jose A. Scheinkman
Columbia University; Princeton University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
NBER Working Paper No. w9722
We present a multiperiod agency model of stock based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors are overconfident and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. We show that optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term stock performance, at the expense of long run fundamental value, as an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a different perspective for the recent corporate crisis than the increasingly popular `rent extraction view' of executive compensation.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56working papers series
Date posted: May 25, 2006
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.406 seconds