Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=410657
 
 

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Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant Opposition


Bronwyn H. Hall


University of California at Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Stuart J. H. Graham


Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business

Dietmar Harhoff


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

David C. Mowery


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

May 2003

NBER Working Paper No. w9731

Abstract:     
The recent surge in U.S. patenting and expansion of patentable subject matter has increased patent office backlogs and raised concerns that in some cases patents of insufficient quality or with inadequate search of prior art are being issued. At the same time patent litigation and its costs are rising. This paper explores the potential of a post-grant review process modeled on the European opposition system to improve patent quality, reveal overlooked prior art, and reduce subsequent litigation. We argue that the welfare gains to such a system may be substantial.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26


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Date posted: May 25, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Hall, Bronwyn H. and Graham, Stuart J. H. and Harhoff, Dietmar and Mowery, David C., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant Opposition (May 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9731. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=410657

Contact Information

Bronwyn H. Hall (Contact Author)
University of California at Berkeley ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
HOME PAGE: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/index.html
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom
Stuart J. H. Graham
Georgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business ( email )
800 West Peachtree St. NW
Atlanta, GA 30308
United States
404-385-0953 (Phone)
404-894-6030 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.scheller.gatech.edu/graham

Dietmar Harhoff
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )
Munich, 80539
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
David C. Mowery
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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