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Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality Via Post-Grant OppositionBronwyn H. HallUniversity of California at Berkeley; University of Maastricht - Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) Stuart J. H. GrahamGeorgia Institute of Technology - Scheller College of Business; Office of Chief Economist, United States Patent and Trademark Office Dietmar HarhoffUniversity of Munich - Munich School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Center for European Economic Research (ZEW); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) David C. MoweryUniversity of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) May 2003 NBER Working Paper No. w9731 Abstract: The recent surge in U.S. patenting and expansion of patentable subject matter has increased patent office backlogs and raised concerns that in some cases patents of insufficient quality or with inadequate search of prior art are being issued. At the same time patent litigation and its costs are rising. This paper explores the potential of a post-grant review process modeled on the European opposition system to improve patent quality, reveal overlooked prior art, and reduce subsequent litigation. We argue that the welfare gains to such a system may be substantial.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26 working papers seriesDate posted: May 25, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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