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Other-regarding Preferences: Egalitarian Warm Glow, Empathy, and Group Size


Dale O. Stahl


University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

Ernan Haruvy


University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

February 23, 2003


Abstract:     
An abundance of experimental evidence in recent years has demonstrated the existence of other-regarding behavior in the laboratory. In a series of dictator experiments, we investigate the effects of warm glow egalitarianism, empathy, and their interaction with group size. We find that the random-payoff method may distort incentives in favor of egalitarian behavior by allowing for path-dependent egalitarian warm glow to outweigh monetary payoffs. Though we find some evidence for empathy, it nevertheless appears that a group size of six or more neutralizes most other-regarding behavior in many-recipient dictator games.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Warm glow, egalitarianism, empathy, group size, dictator games

JEL Classification: C15, C52, C72

working papers series


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Date posted: June 25, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Stahl, Dale O. and Haruvy, Ernan, Other-regarding Preferences: Egalitarian Warm Glow, Empathy, and Group Size (February 23, 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=410925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.410925

Contact Information

Dale O. Stahl (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )
Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-475-8541 (Phone)
512-471-3510 (Fax)
Ernan Haruvy
University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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