Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=411480
 
 

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Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law


K.A.D. Camara


Camara & Sibley LLP

December 2003



Abstract:     
In this paper, I consider the characteristics, limits and promise of shareholder voting as one of many mechanisms that have evolved to constrain deviance by directors from the maximization of shareholder wealth. Finding the existing menu of control mechanisms imperfect, Professor Lucian Bebchuk and other corporate reformers have suggested an increased power in shareholders to intervene in corporate decisions traditionally reserved to the board of directors. The reformers' primary argument is that, under present law, directors can bundle decisions on unrelated actions, for instance a decision on payment of dividends with a decision on management's continued service, thereby limiting the effectiveness of shareholder voting as a control mechanism. I show that this bundling problem is illusory, offer an alternative explanation of the ineffectiveness of shareholder voting and demonstrate that this alternative explanation undercuts the reformers' policy prescription. I conclude that an increased power of shareholder intervention is unlikely to benefit shareholders.

Please see Accepted Paper version at http://ssrn.com/abstract=639381.

Keywords: Corporation, corporate law, corporate governance, shareholder, voting, bundling, board, directors, shareholder wealth maximization, empowering shareholders, SEC

JEL Classification: D20,D23,D70,D71,G10,G30,G31,G32,G34,G38,K22

working papers series


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Date posted: August 13, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Camara, K.A.D., Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law (December 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=411480 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.411480

Contact Information

Kiwi Alejandro Danao Camara (Contact Author)
Camara & Sibley LLP ( email )
2800 Post Oak Blvd., Ste. 5220
Houston, TX 77056
United States
7139666789 (Phone)
7135831131 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.camarasibley.com/camara.html
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