Can Electoral Mobility Diminish Economic Performance? Evidence from the US Telecommunications Sector

Abstract:     
Electoral mobility (i.e., individuals' propensity to vote in elections) is popularly cited as reflecting a polity's health. Increased mobility can, however, diminish economic performance. For example, while mobile electorates can check producer monopolies, they can also facilitate consumer monopsonies and weaken regulatory commitments. Looking at a relatively controlled setting (i.e., the US local exchange sector), I find evidence that electoral mobility may have diminished economic performance through such channels. Moreover, I encounter considerable difficulty when attempting to dismiss this evidence as either an artifact of endogeneity bias or as support for an alternative normative inference.

Keywords: Electoral Institutions, Voter Turnout, Regulatory Capture, Regulatory Commitment, Telecommunications Policy, Economic Performance

JEL Classifications: D72, D78, L96

Working Paper Series