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Strategic Trade Policy and Merger Profitability
Steffen Huck University College London - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Kai A. Konrad Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) May 2003 CESifo Working Paper Series No. 948 Abstract: We study the profitability incentives of mergers and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Mergers change the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show here that mergers can be profitable and welfare-enhancing, even though they would not be profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments' incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. A national merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas an international merger does not.
Keywords: Merger Incentives, Strategic Trade Policy JEL Classifications: D43, D44, F12, L11, L13 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 11, 2003 ; Last revised: August 17, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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