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Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation


Hans Gersbach


Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, (CER-ETH); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Hans H. Haller


Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Economics

May 2003

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 953

Abstract:     
We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these outside options on group formation, group stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Household Behavior, Household Formation, Collective Decision Making, General Equilibrium

JEL Classification: D10, D50, D62, D70

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Date posted: June 17, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Haller, Hans H., Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation (May 2003). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 953. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=415021

Contact Information

Hans Gersbach (Contact Author)
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, (CER-ETH) ( email )
Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Hans H. Haller
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University - Department of Economics ( email )
3021 Pamplin Hall
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States
540-231-7591 (Phone)
540-231-5097 (Fax)
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