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Power Markets: Transferring Systematic Risk to Lottery Players


James D. Miller


Smith College - Department of Economics

Matthew R. Morey


Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics

Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 118-133, June 2003

Abstract:     
This article shows how a state could design a lottery that absorbs some of the financial market's systematic risk. Under this lottery, prizes would be positively correlated with the stock market. This lottery could be a profitable complement to existing state lotteries.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: September 17, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Miller, James D. and Morey, Matthew R., Power Markets: Transferring Systematic Risk to Lottery Players. Public Budgeting & Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 118-133, June 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=416192

Contact Information

James D. Miller (Contact Author)
Smith College - Department of Economics ( email )
101 Pierce Hall
Northampton, MA 01063
United States
413-585-3613 (Phone)
413-585-7611 (Fax)
Matthew R. Morey
Pace University - Lubin School of Business - Department of Finance and Economics ( email )
One Pace Plaza
New York, NY 10038-1502
United States
212-618-6471 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://webpage.pace.edu/mmorey/
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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