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The Political Economy of PrivatizationBernardo BortolottiUniversità di Torino Paolo PinottiBocconi University - BAFFI - Paolo Baffi Centre on Central Banking and Financial Regulation June 2003 FEEM Working Paper No. 45.2003 Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. Using panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, first we show that the timing and extent of privatization is affected by political fragmentation and proportional elections. As theory predicts, in consensual democracies large-scale privatization appears to be delayed by a war of attrition among different veto players. Second, privatization seems strongly affected by partisan politics. Particularly, right-wing executives with re-election concerns design privatization to spread share ownership among domestic voters.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57 Keywords: Keywords: Political Institutions, Partisan Politics, Privatization JEL Classification: D72, D78, L33 working papers seriesDate posted: July 21, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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