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Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version
Martin Cripps University College London - Department of Economics; Washington University, St. Louis - John M. Olin School of Business George J. Mailath University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Larry Samuelson Yale University May 30, 2003 PIER Working Paper No. 03-016 Abstract: We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
Note: A previous version of this paper can be downloaded at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=322160 Keywords: Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games JEL Classifications: C70, C78 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: June 21, 2003 ; Last revised: June 28, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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