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Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version

Martin Cripps
University College London - Department of Economics; Washington University, St. Louis - John M. Olin School of Business

George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Larry Samuelson
Yale University


May 30, 2003

PIER Working Paper No. 03-016

Abstract:     
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

Note: A previous version of this paper can be downloaded at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=322160

Keywords: Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games

JEL Classifications: C70, C78

Working Paper Series

Date posted: June 21, 2003 ; Last revised: June 28, 2003

Suggested Citation

Cripps, Martin, Mailath, George J. and Samuelson, Larry, Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version (May 30, 2003). PIER Working Paper No. 03-016. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=418600 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.418600


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Contact Information

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7749 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath
Martin Cripps
University College London - Department of Economics ( email )
Gower Street
London
London WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom
Washington University, St. Louis - John M. Olin School of Business ( email )
One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States
314-935-4580 (Phone)
314-935-6359 (Fax)
Larry Samuelson
Yale University ( email )
30 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
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References: 25
Citations: 19

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