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http://ssrn.com/abstract=419600
 
 

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Critique of Williamson's Economic Case for an Efficiencies Defense in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Are Rectangles Really Larger than Triangles?


Samuel C. Thompson, Jr.


The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law

June 17, 2003

UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 3-15

Abstract:     
This article examines the pricing, output, and welfare effects resulting from a merger in which a pre-merger competitively organized market becomes a post merger monopolistically organized market, and the acquiring firm realizes substantial productive efficiencies. The findings call into question the basic assertion by Professor Williamson and others that productive efficiencies are likely to offset the loss in welfare represented by the welfare triangle.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 69

Keywords: antitrust, mergers, welfare triangle

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Date posted: July 17, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Thompson, Jr., Samuel C., Critique of Williamson's Economic Case for an Efficiencies Defense in Antitrust Merger Analysis: Are Rectangles Really Larger than Triangles? (June 17, 2003). UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 3-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=419600 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.419600

Contact Information

Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. (Contact Author)
The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law ( email )
150 South College Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
United States
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