SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Footnotes (485)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution

Orin S. Kerr
George Washington University - Law School



Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This article argues that courts should approach the Fourth Amendment with caution when technology is in flux. When a technology is new or developing rapidly, courts should adopt modest formulations of Fourth Amendment protections that recognize the effectiveness and institutional advantages of statutory privacy protections.

The cautious approach is justified on three grounds. First, caution is consistent with existing judicial practice. The reasonable expectation of privacy test generally has been used by the courts as a term of art that remains closely tied to property law concepts. When a technology implicates privacy but not property, current judicial practice tends to avoid broad interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.

Second, legislative privacy protections are significantly stronger than most commentators appreciate. The case of wiretapping is instructive. While Fourth Amendment scholars often view wiretapping as a constitutional field under Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York, wiretapping has long been a primarily statutory field. Even today, wiretapping practice is governed by statutory commands, not constitutional ones. More broadly, Congress has created a wide range of statutory privacy laws that protect privacy in developing technologies where the courts have declined to offer protection.

Third, legislatures have considerable institutional advantages that enable the legislative privacy rules regulating new technologies to be more balanced, comprehensive, and effective than judicially created rules. Rapid technological change makes it difficult for courts to clarify the law. Courts also lack the institutional capacity to readily appreciate existing technology and the impact of different legal rules. In contrast, courts are well equipped to respond to technological change in the context of criminal procedure rules.

Keywords: Fourth Amendment, privacy, technology, Katz

JEL Classifications: K10, K14, K42

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: July 28, 2004 ; Last revised: February 19, 2005

Suggested Citation

Kerr, Orin S., The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution. Michigan Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=421560


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Orin S. Kerr (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Law School ( email )
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4775 (Phone)
202-994-9817 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.gwu.edu/faculty/profile.asp?ID=3568
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 10,225
Downloads: 694
Download Rank: 8,882
Footnotes: 485

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.328 seconds.