Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
Robert S. Gibbons
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4324-03
In previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. In this paper we extend that model in two ways. First, we incorporate schooling into the model and derive a number of testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence. Second, and more important, we show that introducing "task-specific" human capital allows us to produce cohort effects (i.e., the finding that a cohort that enters a firm at a low wage will continue to earn below-average wages years later). We argue that task-specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications. We also discuss limitations of our (extended) approach.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 43
Keywords: Wage Dynamics, Promotion Dynamics, Human Capitalworking papers series
Date posted: July 13, 2003
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