Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=423260
 
 

References (59)



 
 

Citations (79)



 


 



Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms


Robert S. Gibbons


Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Waldman


Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

June 2003

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4324-03

Abstract:     
In previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. In this paper we extend that model in two ways. First, we incorporate schooling into the model and derive a number of testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence. Second, and more important, we show that introducing "task-specific" human capital allows us to produce cohort effects (i.e., the finding that a cohort that enters a firm at a low wage will continue to earn below-average wages years later). We argue that task-specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications. We also discuss limitations of our (extended) approach.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Wage Dynamics, Promotion Dynamics, Human Capital

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: July 13, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Gibbons, Robert S. and Waldman, Michael, Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (June 2003). MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4324-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=423260 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.423260

Contact Information

Robert S. Gibbons (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics ( email )
E52-432
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0283 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Michael Waldman
Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8631 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,415
Downloads: 558
Download Rank: 25,493
References:  59
Citations:  79

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.250 seconds