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Randomness in Tax EnforcementSuzanne ScotchmerUniversity of California - Department of Economics ; School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Joel B. SlemrodUniversity of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) February 1988 NBER Working Paper No. w2512 Abstract: For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24 working papers seriesDate posted: June 28, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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