Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=426951
 
 

Citations (27)



 
 

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The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

October 1, 2003

The Business Lawyer, Vol. 59, pp. 43-66, 2003
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 428

Abstract:     
The SEC is now considering a proposal to require some public companies to include in their proxy materials candidates for the board nominated by shareholders. I document that incumbents do not currently face any meaningful risk of being replaced via the ballot box, and I argue that providing shareholder access would be a moderate step toward improving board accountability. Analyzing each of the objections that opponents have raised against the proposed shareholder access, I conclude that none of them provides a good basis for opposing it. Indeed, it would be desirable to supplement shareholder access with additional measures to invigorate corporate elections.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: corporate governance, directors, shareholders, shareholder voting, corporate elections, proxy fights, proxy contests, proxy rules, SEC

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

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Date posted: December 5, 2003 ; Last revised: April 29, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A., The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot (October 1, 2003). The Business Lawyer, Vol. 59, pp. 43-66, 2003; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 428. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=426951 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.426951

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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