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Could Higher Taxes Increase the Long-Run Demand for Capital?: Theory and Evidence for Chile


Eduardo M. R. A. Engel


Yale University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Álvaro E. Bustos


Northwestern University - School of Law; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Alexander Galetovic


Universidad de los Andes

July 2003

Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 858

Abstract:     
On theoretical grounds alone, there is no a priori reason why higher taxes should reduce the desired capital stock, since a tax increase reduces marginal returns but also increases depreciation and interest payment allowances. Using a panel of Chilean corporations, this paper estimates a long-run demand for capital valid for a general adjustment-cost structure. Changes in the corporate tax rate are found to have no effect on the long run demand for capital. Furthermore, when making investment decisions, firms ignore the marginal rates paid by their stockholders, suggesting the presence of a corporate veil.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Adjustment Costs, Corporate Veil, Demand for Capital, Depreciation Allowances, User Cost of Capital

JEL Classification: D21, H32

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Date posted: July 22, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Engel, Eduardo M. R. A., Bustos, Álvaro E. and Galetovic, Alexander, Could Higher Taxes Increase the Long-Run Demand for Capital?: Theory and Evidence for Chile (July 2003). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 858. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=427080

Contact Information

Eduardo M. Engel (Contact Author)
Yale University - Department of Economics ( email )
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-5595 (Phone)
203-432-5779 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Álvaro E. Bustos
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
312-503-0282 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/profiles/AlvaroBustos/
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
312-503-0282 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www20.kellogg.northwestern.edu/facdir/faclist.asp
Alexander Galetovic
Universidad de los Andes ( email )
San Carlos de Apoquindo 2200
Santiago
Chile
+56/2/412 9259 (Phone)
+56/2/214 2006 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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