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http://ssrn.com/abstract=427540
 
 

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Information Sharing in Critical Infrastructure Industries: Understanding the Behavioral and Economic Impediments


Amitai Aviram


University of Illinois College of Law

Avishalom Tor


Notre Dame Law School

February 2004

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-30; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 103

Abstract:     
This paper is a specialized version, abbreviated and focused on application to critical infrastructure protection, of our paper titled "Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing." Impediments to information sharing between firms operating critical infrastructure have been identified as a key security concern in the recently promulgated National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets. This paper identifies economic and behavioral impediments to information sharing among rivals in general, and rivals operating critical infrastructure in particular. The paper then assesses conditions affecting the severity of these impediments. Finally, the paper takes first steps in developing a framework that will predict more accurately when private information sharing would be suboptimal and suggest how better to align private information sharing with social optimality.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Information sharing, information exchange, antitrust, cooperation, collective action, degradation, norms, rivalry, risk, loss aversion, omission bias

JEL Classification: D21, K21, L14, L20, L41

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Date posted: August 22, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Aviram, Amitai and Tor, Avishalom, Information Sharing in Critical Infrastructure Industries: Understanding the Behavioral and Economic Impediments (February 2004). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-30; FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 103. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=427540 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.427540

Contact Information

Amitai Aviram (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Avishalom Tor
Notre Dame Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States
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