Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

15 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2003

See all articles by George J. Mailath

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Research School of Economics, ANU

Andrew Postlewaite

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Volker Nocke

University of Mannheim

Date Written: June 23, 2003

Abstract

We posit that the value of a manager's human capital depends on the firm's business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives affects the organization of business activities, both the internal organization of the firm and the determination of firm boundaries. We illustrate the impact of this interaction on firm boundaries in a dynamic agency model. There may be disadvantages in merging two firms even when such a merger allows the internalization of externalities between the two firms. Merging, by making unprofitable certain decisions, increases the cost of inducing managerial effort. This incentive cost is a natural consequence of the manager's business-strategy-specific human capital.

JEL Classification: D21, D82, M19, L23

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J. and Postlewaite, Andrew and Nocke, Volker, Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives (June 23, 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=432200 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.432200

George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7908 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU ( email )

HW Arndt Building
College of Business and Economics
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

Andrew Postlewaite (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew

Volker Nocke

University of Mannheim ( email )

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