Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=433807
 
 

References (19)



 
 

Citations (14)



 


 



Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information


Walter Novaes


Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

June 2003

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3945

Abstract:     
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled 'bureaucratic' and inefficient. This Paper argues that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multi-layer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Bureaucracy, organizations, turnover

JEL Classification: D20, G30, L20

working papers series


Date posted: August 13, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Novaes, Walter and Zingales, Luigi, Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information (June 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3945. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=433807

Contact Information

Walter Novaes
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics ( email )
Rua Marques de Sao Vicente, 225/206F
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22453
Brazil
Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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References:  19
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