Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=433844
 
 

References (17)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace


Gilat Levy


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics

Ronny Razin


London School of Economics - Department of Economics

June 2003

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3947

Abstract:     
In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Democratic peace, cheap talk

JEL Classification: D82

working papers series


Date posted: August 19, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Levy, Gilat and Razin, Ronny, It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace (June 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3947. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=433844

Contact Information

Gilat Levy (Contact Author)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6652 (Phone)
Ronny Razin
London School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
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