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It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic PeaceGilat LevyLondon School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics Ronny RazinLondon School of Economics - Department of Economics June 2003 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3947 Abstract: In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 Keywords: Democratic peace, cheap talk JEL Classification: D82 working papers seriesDate posted: August 19, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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