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It Takes Two: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace
Gilat Levy London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics Ronny Razin Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics June 2003 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3947 Abstract: In this paper, we provide an explanation of the democratic peace hypothesis, i.e., the observation that democracies rarely fight one another. We show that in the presence of information asymmetries and strategic complements, the strategic interaction between two democracies differs from any other dyad. In our model, two democracies induce the highest probability of peaceful resolution of conflicts. But it takes two for peace; one democracy involved in a conflict does not necessarily increase the probability of a peaceful resolution compared to a conflict between two non-democratic regimes.
Keywords: Democratic peace, cheap talk JEL Classifications: D82 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 19, 2003 ; Last revised: August 22, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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