Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=434160
 
 

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The Governance of Canadian Traded Firms: An Analysis of the Ultimate Ownership Structure


Najah Attig


Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science

Yoser Gadhoum


University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Business Strategy

April 2003



Abstract:     
We examine the ownership structure of 1121 Canadian listed firms. We analyze their direct and ultimate ownership and control, and other corporate features. We contrast our findings to those reported in recent research for East Asian and Western European firms. We find that ownership and control are relatively concentrated in Canada. The separation of control from ownership is pronounced in Canada. To shed more light on the "puzzling" Canadian corporate governance, we contrast the governance features of firms headquartered in Quebec (QUBFs) against those of firms in the rest of Canada (ROCFs). We find that QUBFs display more ownership and control concentration, more pronounced family and government control, and more pronounced use of pyramidal and multiple class shares than ROCFs. Yet, no distinguishable differences are reported with respect to the deviation between control and ownership.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Corporate Governance, ultimate ownership, divergence of cash flow right and control right

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Date posted: October 16, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Attig, Najah and Gadhoum, Yoser, The Governance of Canadian Traded Firms: An Analysis of the Ultimate Ownership Structure (April 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=434160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.434160

Contact Information

Najah Attig (Contact Author)
Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science ( email )
Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3C3
Canada
902-491-8679 (Phone)
Yoser Gadhoum
University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) - Department of Business Strategy ( email )
School of Business Administration
Montreal, Quebec H3C 4R2
Canada
514 987 3000, extension 3107 (Phone)
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