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Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model


Christopher J. Ellis


University of Oregon - Department of Economics

John Fender


University of Birmingham - Department of Economics

June 2003

University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-13

Abstract:     
We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the "Engine of Growth" is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption.

We study both the model's steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existant empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also does a good job of explaining the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Corruption, Growth, Public Capital

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Date posted: October 1, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Ellis, Christopher J. and Fender, John, Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model (June 2003). University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=436505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436505

Contact Information

Christopher J. Ellis (Contact Author)
University of Oregon - Department of Economics ( email )
Eugene, OR 97403
United States
John Fender
University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
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